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ABSTRACT Why do villagers in China’s most densely populated and productive
agricultural regions use scarce farmland to construct housing? And why has the
Chinese government, which has legislated to conserve arable land so as to ensure
national food security, been unable to control housing construction in the country-
side? Previous studies of the factors motivating the rural housing boom tend to
explain this either as a reaction against insecure property rights in land and a
speculative response to emergent market opportunities, or as a social mobility tactic.
This paper presents interview and survey data from four villages in Zhejiang province
that show that property rights in land do not affect villagers’ housing construction and
market incentives play only a minor role in propelling house-building. The social and
demographic aspirations of families and the reconfiguration of rural households’
economic activities are major stimuli of “the rural house-building craze.”
The unprecedented loss of arable land, and its implications for national
food security, has long been of concern to the Chinese government.
Throughout the 1980s, the government devised a range of policies to
protect farmland and increase investment in agriculture. A national Land
Administration Law, promulgated in 1986, was intended to prevent the
conversion of arable land to non-agricultural uses.1 Yet statisticians
calculate that between the mid-1980s and the mid-1990s, more than
200,000 ha of arable land was lost annually, destroying some 6 per cent
of the country’s total cultivated area.2 Despite a 1997 ban on the use of
farmland for non-agricultural purposes, a national census revealed that
the rate of destruction increased towards the end of the decade. In 1998,
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the total area of farmland declined by 335,000 ha.3 A further 430,000 ha
was lost in 1999.4
The destruction of farmland primarily was caused by desertification,
agricultural restructuring, industrial and infrastructural development, and
what became known as “the rural house-building craze.”5 Estimates vary,
but it is generally accepted that village housing accounted for about 5 to
6 per cent of the total area forfeited.6 The area lost to new housing was
greatest in the central eastern provinces – traditionally a highly produc-
tive agricultural region.7 For example in Zhejiang, the province that is the
focus of this report, new housing consumed more than 8 per cent of the
farmland ruined.8
Notwithstanding the small proportion of land occupied by village
housing, its construction posed a particularly intractable problem for the
central government. Rural land is owned by collectives, rather than the
state, and village houses are the private property of families. Most
villages are unplanned and situated on, or alongside, arable land. As a
general rule, the more fertile the land, the more numerous are the villages;
the wealthier the villages, the more expansive are its houses.9 Throughout
the 1990s, villagers invested an ever-larger proportion of their incomes
in housing. Per capita floor space nearly doubled, a growing percentage
of households owned multiple dwellings, and residences were being
demolished and rebuilt with greater frequency.10 Consequently, although
3. China Daily 10 December 1998, 17 December 1998, accessed at http://
www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy; China News Digest, 9 May 1999, 15 June 1998, accessed at
http://www.cnd.org/CND-Global/; Xinhua, 5 February 1999, accessed at http://www.
xinhuanet.com.
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5. Zhou Min and Kong Qingping, “Ji du huanle ji du chou: guanyu nongcun jianfangre
de toushi” (“A few degrees of joy, a few degrees of gloom: perspectives on the rural
house-building craze”), Cunzhen jianshe (Village and Town Construction), No. 10 (1995),
pp. 40–41.
6. Zhang Tingwei, “Land market forces and government’s role in sprawl: the case of
China,” Cities, Vol. 17, No. 2 (2000), pp. 26–27; Zhongguo tongji nianjian 1998 (China’s
Statistical Yearbook 1998) (Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 1998), p. 389; Zhongguo
tudi nianjian 1994–1995 (China’s Land Yearbook 1994–1995) (Beijing: Beijing renmin
chubanshe, 1995), pp. 148–49; Zhongguo tudi tongji nianjian 1997 (China’s Land Statistical
Yearbook 1997) (Beijing: Zhongguo dadi chubanshe, 1997), p. 199.
7. Robert Ash and Richard Louis Edmonds, “China’s land resources, environment and
agricultural production,” The China Quarterly, No 156 (1998), pp. 840–852.
8. Zhejiang sheng tudi guanli ju, Zhejiang tudi ziyuan (Zhejiang’s Land Resources)
(Hangzhou: Zhejiang kexue jishu chubanshe, 1999); Zhongguo gengdi wanli xing (The Great
March of China’s Cultivated Land) (Beijing: Zhongguo dadi chubanshe, 1998), p. 471;
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tongji chubanshe, 1999), p. 184.
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sites”), Zhongguo tudi (China’s Land), No. 12 (1998), pp. 4–6; Lin Wenyi, “Nongfang jianshe
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Zanyuan, Dai Yunzhuo, Shen Zhiqin, Zhang Jia, “Nongcun jumin dian heli yong di tantao”
(“A discussion of village residents’ rational use of land”), Zhongguo tudi, No. 8 (1998),
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industrial and infrastructural construction on farmland slowed in response
to land use controls, the area of farmland used for dwellings continued to
increase.11
Given the importance and scale of the problem, it is not surprising that
people working in a variety of disciplines, both in China and abroad, have
investigated the reasons for “the rural house-building craze.” Much of the
resulting literature focuses on the effect of institutional reforms, particu-
larly in property rights and markets, in shaping farmers’ attitudes towards
land use.12 Scholars reason that ambiguous, collective property rights in
farmland and the uncertainties that attend the periodic redistribution of
contracted land discourage the conservation and improvement of farm-
land. In addition, the possibility that houses might establish informal,
enduring, use-rights to adjoining farmland offers positive incentives for
construction that are not weighed against the cost considerations which
would come into play if land was priced by markets.13 Other studies show
that villagers have responded to the emergence of new markets by
erecting roadside shop-houses and rental housing in peri-urban areas.14
The development of markets also created conflicts of interest between
different levels of government, resulting in lax and corrupt land adminis-
tration.15 Although the central government aims to ensure the rational,
sustainable use of farmland, lower-level officials enthusiastically promote
housing construction. They earn revenue from land transfers and
construction fees, win promotions by creating jobs in the sector, and
garner popular support by approving and subsidizing housing.16 In many
areas, village leaders supplement their income by “selling” house
footnote continued
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Vol. 35, No. 10 (1995), pp. 922–941.
16. China Daily, 17 December 1998, p. 2; Yan Jiushi, “Nongmin jianfang yongdi zhong
de ‘cunpi’ xianxiang toushi” (“The phenomenon of ‘village approval’ for farmers’ use of land
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sites.17 In sum, new institutional arrangements encouraged “the rural
house-building craze.”
Persuasive as these explanations are, two other strands of research
suggest that property rights and markets might not offer the key to
understanding villagers’ attitudes towards housing and land use. James
Kung found that farmers in less-developed regions actually opposed
proposals to extend and consolidate land contracts because the regular
readjustment of plots accommodated changes in the size of their house-
holds.18 Surveys showed that the area of land devoted to new housing was
similar in villages that never redistributed contract land and in villages
that regularly readjusted holdings, suggesting that tenurial security does
not influence construction activities.19 In fact, the low profitability of
agriculture is a stronger disincentive to farming than land use contracts,20
and simultaneously depresses whatever exchange value protected farm-
land has.
But why invest scarce resources in housing construction? Sociologists
have long argued that complex social and cultural factors propel house-
building. Villagers’ ownership of a large, new house demonstrates their
wealth and “face” and helps to attract marriage and business partners.21
Parents who construct dwellings earn the gratitude of their children,
commonly expressed in the form of support in old age. House-building
offers opportunities to improve the living conditions of a family not only
in the present but also, through geomantic intervention, in the future.22 I
adopted an emic approach in investigating “the rural house-building
craze,” asking villagers why they continue to build ever-bigger dwellings.
A further question was whether recent government efforts to control land
use will succeed in slowing their construction of housing.
My data, collected in four villages in Zhejiang province in the late
summer of 2000, suggest that “the rural house-building craze” is not
primarily caused by concerns about property rights in farmland. Nor, in
footnote continued
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Daily), 28 April 1999; 21, 30 June 2000; 7 July 2000.
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Journal of Comparative Economics, No. 21 (1995), pp. 82–111.
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20. Elisabeth J. Croll and Huang Ping, “Migration for and against agriculture in eight
Chinese villages,” The China Quarterly, No. 149 (1997), pp. 129–146.
21. Terry McKinley, The Distribution of Wealth in Rural China (New York: M. E. Sharpe,
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improvement”), Cunzhen jianshe, No. 6 (1990), pp. 20–21, 15; Zhang Guoliang, “Nongcun
zhuzhai jianshe de sikao” (“Reflections on rural housing construction”), Cunzhen jianshe,
No. 5 (1990), pp. 22–23.
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most cases, is it a response to new markets. Rather, house-building
reflects families’ demographic and social aspirations. Villagers are build-
ing for their family’s future. These motives were overlooked by the
authors of the Chinese government’s latest legislative attempt to preserve
arable land: the 1999 (revised) Land Administration Law. Their oversight
might weaken the effectiveness of the law in controlling rural housing
construction.
The article discusses, in turn, the provisions and aims of the 1999
legislation relating to the use of land for housing; the field sites and
methodology employed in Zhejiang; research findings; and the implica-
tions of these findings for legislative efforts to preserve farmland by
controlling land use.
1999 (Revised) Land Administration Law
On 1 January 1999, China’s revised Land Administration Law23 (LAL)
came into effect. Described by the Chinese press as imposing “the
world’s strictest land-use regulations,”24 the LAL explicitly aimed to
strengthen land administration, safeguard public ownership of land, use
arable land rationally, and protect land resources so as to promote
sustainable development.25
The LAL hinges on a dual strategy. First, the government has asserted
centralized, macro-controls over land use. Annual plans for land utiliza-
tion must conform to the national plan for economic development and
plans specifying categories and targets of land utilization. Each province
is required to formulate and submit for central government approval a
long-term plan that classifies land for agricultural, construction and other
purposes, and guarantees to protect and improve the quality of more than
80 per cent of farmland. The conversion of protected farmland to
non-agricultural purposes requires approval from the State Council,
provinces or municipalities directly under the central government. If such
approval is granted, an equivalent area of new farmland must be created.
Construction on collectively owned land must conform to plans drawn up
by villages in accordance with town, county, provincial and national land
use plans. Village households are only eligible to own one house, the
ground floor of which must not exceed provincial standards. In so far as
it is possible, new residences must be built on old or vacant house sites.
Villagers who have sold or rented their house are ineligible to apply for
a site. Non-complying dwellings built before promulgation of the LAL
cannot be rebuilt or extended. Associated regulations issued in April 1999
grant lower level governments the authority to reclaim land approved for
23. Zhonghua renmin gongheguo, Zhonghua renmin gongheguo tudi guanli fa, di er ci
xiuzheng (People’s Republic of China Land Administration Law, revised), 1999.
24. Xinhua, 1 January 1999.
25. Jiang Ailin, “Xin jiu tudi guanli fa bijiao” (“A comparison of the new and old
Land Administration Laws”), Zhongguo fangdichan (Real Estate in China), No. 2 (1999), p.
13–15.
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construction but left idle.26 The Ministry of Land and Resources
is authorized to investigate breaches of the LAL and recommend
disciplinary action or charges against those guilty of infringements.27
Secondly, the LAL strengthens villagers’ collective and individual
property rights in land. Ownership rights are exercised by village collec-
tive economic organizations or village committees. Farmers’ contracts for
farmland are guaranteed for 30 years unless changes are approved by a
two-thirds majority of the village assembly. Farmers that undertake to
operate farmland under contract have a duty to protect the land and use
it in conformity with the purposes of use stipulated in the contract. In the
event that farmland is requisitioned by the state or used for construction
by the collective, compensation payments and resettlement subsidies
must be reported publicly and subsidies transferred in full to resettled
villagers.
Comparative studies elsewhere suggest that land conservation legis-
lation is most effective when it accommodates economic, demographic
and social changes.28 The dual strategies incorporated into the LAL
reflect assumptions on the part of its architects that the law not only
required stringent centralized planning, reporting and enforcement of land
use and regulation of real estate markets, but also had to serve villagers’
economic interests.29 Strengthening farmers’ land use rights was expected
to encourage their preservation of arable land and discourage construction
on farmland.30 Field research was designed, in part, to assess whether the
lawmakers had overestimated the incentive effects of stronger land-use
rights and underestimated demographic and social motives for housing
construction.
Research Location and Methodology
In many respects, Zhejiang is an ideal location in which to investigate
villagers’ attitudes towards housing construction and land use controls. In
the decade preceding promulgation of the LAL, provincial and municipal
governments in Zhejiang introduced a range of measures to limit con-
struction on farmland. In 1989, a plan was drawn up to protect basic
agricultural districts. County Land Management Bureaus were forbidden
to approve more house sites than allowed by annual quotas. In 1995, the
provincial government convened a “leaders’ small group” to direct and
act upon six investigations into land management. One year later, the
26. China News Digest, 9 May 1999; China Daily, 4 February 1999; Guotu ziyuan bao,
2 March 1999.
27. Pi Chunxie (ed.), Xin tudi guanli fa lilun yu shiyong (Theory and Application of the
New Land Administration Law) (Beijing: Zhongguo fazhi chubanshe, 1999); Xinhua, 7
January 1999.
28. Rachelle Alterman, “The challenge of farmland preservation: lessons from a six-nation
comparison,” Journal of the American Planning Association, Vol. 63, No. 2 (1997),
pp. 220–243; Jeanne S. White, “Beating ploughshares into townhouses: the loss of farmland
and strategies for slowing its conversion to nonagricultural use,” Environmental Law,
Vol. 28, No. 1 (1998), pp. 113–143.
29. Joshua Muldavin, “The paradoxes of environmental policy and resource management
in reform-era China,” Economic Geography, Vol. 76, No. 3 (2000), pp. 244–284.
30. Xinhua, 24 August 1998; China Daily, 21 December 1998.
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provincial People’s Congress passed “Regulations on the supervision and
control of land in Zhejiang.”31 Further regulations, passed in 2000 to
supplement the LAL, stipulated that new houses must be constructed in
rows on vacant sites or hillsides; sites can only be allocated to new
households or families that demolish their dwellings and relinquish the
site for reallocation; and that the area of the site is determined by
household size and land quality.32 Everywhere, slogans exhorted people
to conserve farmland for future generations. Nevertheless, at the end of
2000 Zhu Yinchuan, head of the Land Management Bureau in the
provincial capital, Hangzhou, lamented that farmland was still being lost,
and structurally sound houses demolished to be replaced by ever more
expansive residences.33
However, the high levels of industrialization, urbanization and income
in Zhejiang make it an atypical location in which to conduct research into
rural housing and land use. With that anomaly in mind, four villages were
selected to encompass variations in their distance to cities, economic
structure and average income, the amount of time spent farming, the
proportion of household income derived from agriculture and the degree
to which settlements are planned. All four are administrative villages
with similar populations, small households, miniscule landholdings and
Map 1: Research Sites in Zhejiang Province
31. Land Yearbook 1997, pp. 90–91.
32. Zhejiang sheng renda fazhi weiyuanhui, Zhejiang sheng guotu ziyuan ting, Zhejiang
sheng shishi “Zhonghua renmin gongheguo tudi guanli fa” banfa (Zhejiang Province
Methods for Implementing “People’s Republic of China Land Administration Law”)
(Hangzhou, 2000); Interviews Shengzhou city Land Management Bureau, 22 July 2000,
Shaoxing city Land Management Bureau, 20 July 2000.
33. Guotu ziyuan bao, 15 November 2000.
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numerous new houses – defined as dwellings built between 1990 and
2000 (see Tables 1 and 2).
The first village, which I shall call Lehuo,34 is located near Shengzhou
city (see Map 1). It is well served by road and rail transport. Four features
distinguish Lehuo from the other villages surveyed. First, it is a model of
unified planning. As early as 1983, Shengzhou city government imple-
mented village planning to conserve farmland, reduce land disputes and
revitalize “empty heart” villages, created when families abandoned old
houses in the centre of settlements and rebuilt on the outskirts.35 Now, a
new four-storey committee building, a well-resourced cultural centre and
an elderly residents’ association hall form the “heart” of Lehuo. In the
1990s, approximately two-thirds of all housing was rebuilt in row-fashion
alongside five-metre wide concrete roads. All dwellings have electricity,
piped water and sewerage, and most have telephones. Secondly, Lehuo is
wealthy. More than 66 per cent of surveyed households reported annual
incomes of between 25,001 and 45,000 yuan. The main sources of wealth
are quarrying, ceramics, metal casting, electronics, apparel and city jiaozi
restaurants. Thirdly, unlike the other research sites where contract land
was reallocated twice during the 1990s, in Lehuo there was no readjust-
ment. Most residents could not be bothered farming, so informally and
gratis they offered their land to the few who still farmed. Finally, many
married women in Lehuo described themselves as “housewives.”
Yubao is administered by Yuhang city, but lies in a ribbon of suburban
development that spools out alongside a new highway. Construction of
the highway led to the resumption of Yubao land by Hangzhou city.
Several villagers expressed a hope that Hangzhou would resume more
land, because the compensation fees and resettlement subsidies paid by
Hangzhou were higher than those paid by Yuhang. A plan to encourage
infill development was approved in 1999 but has not yet been imple-
mented. The settlement pattern is dispersed, with concrete roads provid-
ing vehicle access to clusters of houses interspersed with rice fields and
fish-ponds. All houses have electricity and piped water, and 70 per cent
have telephones. Approximately two-thirds of village families occupy
new, free-standing houses, many of which were built on reclaimed paddy
and ponds. The main sources of income are private commerce, transport,
and printing and processing factories. All young adults are in non-
agricultural employment, prompting jokes that farming expertise in the
village will pass away with the demise of the elderly. The only significant
source of agricultural income is from aquaculture. Contracts for fish-
ponds rotate annually. Yubao’s factories employ some 400 immigrant
workers – equal to nearly one-third of the population. This fuels a
thriving rental market. Rents received are not declared, so official statis-
tics on income are understated. Some 40 per cent of households surveyed
reported annual incomes ranging between 11,001 and 35,000 yuan, but
34. Village names have been altered to protect respondents’ anonymity.
35. Shengzhou tudi guanli ju, Shengzhou shi tudi zhi (History of Land in Shengzhou City)
(Shengzhou, 1999).
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almost half of all households declined to declare their incomes. From
interviews, I gleaned that the average annual household income was
between 20,000 and 30,000 yuan.
Qingshui, under the jurisdiction of Jiangshan city, is in the most remote
and poorest region of Zhejiang, the south-west. A plan for Qingshui was
devised in the late 1990s, but has not been implemented. The settlement
comprises several small hamlets clustered around networks of narrow dirt
and cobble paths that lead off a road connecting two small towns. There
is no vehicular access inside the hamlets. Between 1990 and 2000, more
than one-third of all households built new dwellings, predominantly on
farmland alongside the road and paths. All houses have electricity, but
few have telephones and there is no piped water or sewerage. In
comparison to the houses built in the other three villages, new residences
in Qingshui are small, unattractive and ill-equipped. Nevertheless, they
are vastly superior to the dilapidated earth and wooden houses in which
the majority of villagers still live. Some 19 per cent of households
surveyed reported annual incomes less than 5,000 yuan, and a further
38.2 per cent reported earning between 5,001 and 11,000 yuan. Since the
closure in 1999 of a cement factory in which nearly 100 villagers had
been employed, the main sources of income have been the sale of goose
feathers, pigs and dried vegetables. Owing to a lack of off-farm employ-
ment opportunities in the area, many households also rely on remittances
from youngsters working in cities.
Zhulong is in a river valley 25 kilometres from its governing munici-
pality, Fuyang. The village spans a road linking two provincial highways.
In contrast to the experience of Yubao, the resumption of land to allow
construction of this road in 1989 caused dissension among villagers. The
person who was village Party secretary at that time said that as soon as
he received notice that the road was to be built, he requisitioned and
merged the land of all 18 production teams in the village and, setting
aside 60 mu on either side of the new road, redistributed the remaining
farmland. Then:
I sold the [60 mu of] land to people who wanted to establish factories and shops.
People from other villages bought it, as well as some locals. They paid 10,000 yuan
per mu … The villagers didn’t like it at the time. They said they didn’t have enough
land left to support them. This area is half mountain. There isn’t much paddy land.
But they couldn’t see that they would be better off working in the factories. They
complained, wrote a letter to the Ministry of Agriculture in Beijing asking that I be
investigated. Nothing happened. I’d done the right thing. A lot of people who
complained then are making good money in these factories now. You can’t make
money farming, can you?36
New canning, paper and rubber factories certainly are a major source
of the 15,000 to 25,000 yuan earned annually by most households.
However, farmers were not compensated for the reduced allocation of
farmland. Moreover, industrialization has resulted in the pollution of
36. Interview Zhulong, 14 July 2000.
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Zhulong’s river, paddy fields and the wells that supply potable water. A
village plan began to be implemented only in 1999. Slightly more than
half of all households live in new dwellings built alongside the main road.
These are serviced by piped water and vehicular access. Across the river,
old village houses are separated by narrow, winding paths, have limited
exposure to sunlight and inadequate provision for water and waste
disposal.
Three research strategies were employed. Self-administered question-
naires were first distributed to a random sample of households in
Zhulong. The low response rate (10 per cent) produced unrepresentative
data. In Lehuo, Yubao and Qingshui, college students were trained to
administer a survey. Between 25 and 35 per cent of all households in
these villages completed anonymous questionnaires, giving a total sample
of 296 households. Data allowed correlation and comparison of respon-
dants’ sex, age, housing situation, occupation, income, age, education and
attitudes towards housing and land use controls. Semi-structured inter-
views lasting between one and two hours were conducted with ten
additional households in each village. And officials from local city and
town Land Management Bureaus, and village heads, Party secretaries and
committee members, were interviewed to determine how villagers had
responded to the constraints on land use imposed by the LAL.
Motives for House-Building: Owners and Aspirants
As might be expected, there is a rough correlation between the mean
average income in a village, the proportion of households owning new
dwellings and the area occupied by new houses. In the two wealthiest
villages, Lehuo and Yubao, more than half of all households live in new
houses, and those houses are considerably larger than new dwellings in
Qingshui and Zhulong. However, although houses in the wealthiest
village, Lehuo, have the largest average floor space, the village does not
display the highest level of building activity over the past ten years. In
Lehuo, incomes rose dramatically in the 1980s. Many families rebuilt as
soon as they became well off. In the 1990s, the village committee
implemented unified planning and land-use controls. The owners of new
houses preferred to renovate rather than attempt to meet eligibility criteria
for new house sites.
Similarly, in all four villages, the great majority of households with
incomes over 20,000 yuan occupy new, large dwellings. Several wealthy
households have more than one residence and many are renovating
houses that were only constructed a few years earlier. Officials are
disproportionately represented among new house-owners, and their new
houses tend to be larger than others. In Qingshui, the house and courtyard
of one of the Party secretary’s three residences occupies approximately
250 square metres of land, more than twice the maximum area allowed
to large families under the provincial regulations. Conversely, the poorer
the family, the less likely they are to own a new house, a large house or
more than one house. And the more days that are spent farming and the
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higher is the proportion of household income derived from agriculture,
the poorer the family.
To assess potential demand for new houses, villagers were asked
whether, if given sufficient money, they would rebuild. With few excep-
tions, most respondents that occupy dwellings put up after 1994 said that
they would not. They preferred to invest in a business, children’s
education or a new car. Virtually all of the 123 households that live in old
houses and most in dwellings built before 1994 said that they would
rebuild. The only villagers that do not aspire to a new house are a handful
of elderly couples who either like their familiar surroundings or fear that
if they rebuild, their children might move in with them: “We are used to
this life. Older people don’t like moving. You’ve heard the saying, ‘Gold
house, silver house, isn’t as good as my family’s grass house (Jin wu, yin
wu, buru jiali de caowu)’.”37
As shown in Table 3, of 173 surveyed households with new houses, the
great majority said they built because they wanted to sustain, expand or
divide their families. Space for children was the single most common
motive mentioned. Given that many households, particularly in Qingshui
and Zhulong, had originally lived in cramped conditions, this explanation
seems unremarkable at first glance. However, even the residents of
sizeable old houses in Lehuo and Yubao said they needed to provide
more space for children. And although interviewees repeatedly said that
all the new space was necessary, without exception new buildings
contained empty rooms – often occupying one-third the total floor area:
Interviewee: Each room is used every day. Downstairs we have the shop and
storerooms. The second floor has bedrooms, a bathroom, living area and kitchen.
Sargeson: What about the third floor?
Interviewee: We only use it to store a few things.
Sargeson: Didn’t you say you use every room every day?
Interviewee: The mice use it! No one uses their third floor. Families only have a few
people so they don’t need all that space.38
When asked their reason for constructing surplus space, some people
answered that they simply wanted a house as big as their neighbours’
house. But the majority mentioned another family-centred motive for
building: the extra room might be used by their son after his marriage.
The provision of separate living areas for new couples is seen as a means
of eliminating friction between generations, particularly between mothers
and daughters-in-law, and thereby allowing family extension. It also
helps to maintain harmony even in families that have already divided:
“I’d like three big living areas, 20 square metres or more, containing
separate bedrooms and bathrooms. Then when my sons came home for
holidays there would be enough room for us all.”39
Extra rooms also provide for the reallocation of space from collective
to individual purposes. New houses typically comprise layers of suites of
37. Interview Lehuo, 23 July 2000.
38. Interview Zhulong, 11 July 2000.
39. Interview Lehuo, 24 July 2000.
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living rooms, bedrooms and bathrooms that accommodate the increas-
ingly divergent lifestyles of different generations. The elderly can retire
early, while children can play computer games and watch their preferred
television programmes out of their parents’ hearing. Although the spatial
individualization and differentiation of family life is most apparent in the
affluent villages, even in the poorest village, Qingshui, new houses
contain empty floors that will be fitted out and decorated for single
generations when money becomes available. Simultaneously, residual
collective living areas are being redesigned. The formal reception hall at
the front of houses that once functioned as the stage for ethical instruction
and public and kinship ceremonial40 is being supplanted by an asymmetri-
cal, open-plan living area designed and furnished to mould interaction
among individuals within the family, rather than to accommodate inter-
action between the family as an hierarchical kin group and the outside
world and the after-life.
The impending marriage of a son frequently motivated housing
construction in the two wealthiest villages. One successful Lehuo
entrepreneur constructed a new house for each of his two teenage sons,
specifically to enhance their marriage prospects. But even in Qingshui,
this was thought to be such a popular strategy that one respondent wrote:
“A new house shows that a family has an unmarried son. Without the son,
they would have no need to rebuild.”41 When asked whether the pos-
session of a new house is advantageous to young people finding a
marriage partner, more than 80 per cent of those surveyed agreed,
arguing: “No woman would marry a man without a new house.” A new
house demonstrates to a woman that the man’s family has “face,” assets,
financial security and good social contacts and can provide her with
comfortable, hygienic and “more private” accommodation. Approxi-
mately one-sixth of all respondents explicitly wrote that new houses allay
potential brides’ fears about indebtedness: “A new house tells women that
if they marry into that family, there will be no need for the newly-weds
to borrow to build.”
Concerns about the deleterious effects of debt on families’ future
opportunities are another common motive for house-building. In Yubao,
where there is widespread antipathy towards both out-migration and
family division, houses are intended to provide descendent generations
with an unmortgaged dwelling, thereby allowing them to invest in
businesses.
Equally common is the idea that a new house will provide a sanctuary
to which peripatetic members of the family can retire in their old age.
Respondents in Lehuo, Qingshui and Zhulong all remarked that young-
sters who had migrated in search of work would return in their old age
40. Ronald G. Knapp, China’s Living Houses: Folk Belief, Symbols and Household
Ornamentation (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1999); Jing Qimin, Zhongguo
chuantong minju (Traditional Chinese Dwellings) (Tianjin: Tianjin University Press, 1999),
p. 110.
41. For a fictional treatment of this subject, see Gao Xiaosheng, “Li Shunda builds a
house,” in Lee Yee (ed.), The New Realism (New York: Hippocrene Books, 1983), pp. 31–55.
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to live in the houses their wages helped to build: “Leaves fall to the roots
of the tree (yeluo-guigen).” One respondent in Lehuo said that the
beneficial fengshui of his family’s old house-site had helped his sons to
establish themselves abroad. He would rebuild on the site to preserve
their luck and provide them with a “home-land” where they could meet
up with old friends, eat familiar food and speak dialect.
Family division historically has prompted housing construction in the
Chinese countryside. Statistics indicate that early family division is the
norm in three of the surveyed villages, where even stem households are
becoming uncommon. In fact, in all villages but Yubao, the great
majority of interviewees thought that newly married couples should move
into their own house. In Lehuo and Zhulong, villagers thought separate
households were preferable because they gave people the freedom to
determine their own routines and consumption patterns. As one old
fellow put it: “We eat different foods. We like soft foods, young people
like food that is crisp.”42 In Qingshui, young couples were expected to
become self-supporting: “We are always scrimping and saving, whereas
young people waste money. If my sons had their way, they wouldn’t
divide. They’d want us to support them and look after their kids. But I
think they should stand alone and look after themselves.”43 One woman
in Qingshui, covered in bruises from a recent beating, wistfully said that
division reduced intra-familial conflict. Like the provision of more space
for children, then, division is viewed as a means of allowing families
to maintain harmonious relations among generations with increasingly
divergent lifestyles. And, like the provision of space for children, division
requires the construction of a new house.
In some cases, however, the causal relationship between household
division and building is reversed: the desire to build precipitates division.
In Lehuo and Qingshui, a few families functioned as single production
and consumption units, despite the fact that offspring owned new resi-
dences. This bogus division was explained as a stratagem to acquire
another house site and build in case land-use controls were imposed and
construction costs escalated.44
Of the primary motives given for housing construction, the second
most frequently cited explanation was that the family’s old house was
dilapidated or inconvenient. Yet in the two affluent villages, some houses
that were described as dilapidated or inconvenient were structurally
sound, large and had been built within the past decade. In Qingshui,
where old housing stock is in considerably worse repair than elsewhere,
only nine respondents said their old residence was derelict. The anomaly
reflects higher expectations of housing in the former two villages, fed by
their receptivity, via proximity to cities and television and magazine
advertising, to changing fashions. The standards applied in defining a
42. Interview Lehuo, 24 July 2000.
43. Interview Qingshui, 27 July 2000.
44. This finding supports previous reports that division may allow villagers to achieve
goals relating to land or housing. See, for example, Ya Ping Wang and Alan Murie, Housing
Policy and Practice in China (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999), p. 222.
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house as “dilapidated” or “backward” further underscores the influence of
marketing in establishing ever-higher expectations of architectural sophis-
tication and comfort in Lehuo and Yubao. Villagers who want to live in
a “more beautiful” house described their ideal as a free-standing, pastel
coloured Californian bungalow or European villa (bieshu), with ornamen-
tal balconies, an enclosed garden and decorative furnishings. The three-
storey rectangular concrete structures thrown up in the 1980s and early
1990s were disparaged, even by their owners, as ugly, poorly designed
and anachronistic: “I’d like a prettier house. This is really old-fashioned.
The houses got bigger in the 1990s but now people are less concerned
with the size and height of a house and more concerned with external
appearance and modern interior designs.”45 In Qingshui, people are still
satisfied with houses that offer shelter from the weather and mosquitoes
and ample space. Nevertheless, in all villages aesthetic preferences are
decidedly modern and urban-influenced. While a few people expressed
admiration for the quality of carpentry in traditional Zhejiang timber
dwellings, none agreed with my opinion that old houses have some
appealing aesthetic and practical features. Instead, interviewees unfa-
vourably compared “messy,” “unhygienic” village houses with the
stylish, clean apartments they saw on television and in magazines.
Neighbouring houses supply another comparative standard by which
the adequacy of dwellings is measured. Many villagers said they were
forced to build because their neighbours had done so and the family’s
reputation was being compromised: “You can tell what a family’s
situation is like if they live in a dump. Everyone borrows money to build
a house so the family gains ‘face’.”46
Some villagers acknowledged that they built in order to reap economic
benefits. Notwithstanding the planning regulations in force in Lehuo, a
young couple there were constructing two huge buildings that they
intended to lease out as commercial premises. Three people in Zhulong
said they “bought” roadside sites to build shop-houses. A handful of
respondents said that they had judged building to be a better investment
than bank savings,47 while one niggardly old fellow in Qingshui said he
had rebuilt solely to stop his sons spending his spare cash. A few wanted
to occupy promising geomantic sites.
Yet even among the villagers that gave overtly economic reasons for
building houses, none mentioned a desire to secure use rights to farmland
or the low cost of converting farmland to residential usage. Not one
respondent said they would contract more farmland or increase their
investment in farming now that tenure had been guaranteed. None
expressed regret that their new house occupied farmland that, under the
LAL, they could have contracted for 30 years. Indeed, one full-time
farmer in Zhulong, oblivious to the provisions of the LAL, said that if he
45. Interview Yubao, 7 August 2000.
46. Interview Yubao, 6 August 2000.
47. Knapp mentions that houses “ ‘store’ wealth” in “Rural housing and village
transformation,” p. 783.
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could afford to, he would build a house on his contract land because
the scenery, light and air there were good. In short, house-building is
not a second-best option in the absence of secure property rights in
farmland. Villagers simply do not consider agriculture to be a worthwhile
investment.
Housing, on the other hand, is. It is an investment in the family’s
future. A new house accommodates increasingly diverse, individualized
lifestyles and thereby allows for family extension. It conveys to the world
information about the wealth and status of its inhabitants, giving sons a
wider choice of potential partners. Unencumbered by debt, young couples
can channel money into business and education. Finally, a new house
offers security and sanctuary to out-migrants and serves as a conduit
through which the wages they earn can be drawn back into the family.
Social Factors Mediating Rural House-Building
Villagers’ housing aspirations and construction activities are not
moderated by endogenous social pressures (see Table 5). Rather, there
is a consensus among rural residents that new houses deliver social,
demographic, economic and aesthetic benefits to all.
When asked whether community or neighbourly relations were affec-
ted by housing construction, fewer than 10 per cent of all respondents
agreed. The overwhelming majority of those who replied in the
affirmative said that trust, sociability and community solidarity increase,
partly because housing loans circulate and space for home entertainment
is created. Several people said mutual respect and community pride has
been fostered by the “urbanization” and “beautification” of their villages.
Only half a dozen respondents complained that housing construction
contributed to an increase in disputes and a loss of social cohesion. In
Qingshui, 20 per cent of those surveyed thought status competition had
intensified. Although few expressed antipathy towards housing construc-
tion, many disapproved of the demolition of old houses because it wasted
space that could be used for storage and livestock.
A quarter of survey respondents agreed that house-building encourages
geographical mobility. The larger percentage of positive responses in
Yubao (27.7 per cent) and Qingshui (37.1 per cent) reflects the relatively
high incidence of in-migration into the former and out-migration from the
latter village. In both locations, respondents said that migration is, in
large measure, prompted by the necessity to accumulate funds for hous-
ing construction. All viewed this causal connection in a positive light, as
a stimulus to communication, employment and marriage.
Despite the centrality of family aspirations in propelling housing
construction, new home-owners do not think that their new house has
altered family interaction and personal esteem. Data summarized in Table
6 indicate that while some occupants of new houses in Yubao (18.1 per
cent) and Qingshui (20.2 per cent) acknowledged that their daily routines
had altered, the overwhelming majority said that they were unaware of
any change in their home life. A few reported that having more privacy,
946 The China Quarterly
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independence and plumbed bathrooms made family relations less
strained. Some 13.9 per cent agreed that their self-esteem improved after
moving into their new abode.
But only 58 per cent of new home-owners felt satisfied with their
house. The variation between Lehuo and Qingshui, where only around
half of all those surveyed are content with their new house, and the other
villages in which there are notably higher levels of satisfaction, might be
a consequence of the heavy planning restrictions imposed in the first
village and the limited economic capacity of Qingshui’s residents. How-
ever, I submit two additional explanations for the counter-intuitive
finding that many new home-owners are dissatisfied with their house.
First, new houses are not just intended to provide immediate gratification
to their inhabitants. They are built to improve the family’s future. People
who are unsure whether they are satisfied with their new house do not yet
know whether it will help them to achieve their longer-term goals.
Secondly, these findings reflect villagers’ sensitivity to the fact that
standards of comfort and style are changing rapidly in China. The
residents of what, yesterday, was considered to be a “beautiful” house
have found that a television programme, magazine advertisement or their
neighbours have now set a new benchmark of “beauty” – a benchmark
that they, too, must try to surpass.48
Attitudes Towards Housing Construction and Land Use Controls
Staff in the township Land Management Bureaus administering the
four surveyed villages all bemoaned the added paperwork associated with
the more rigorous application, approval, reporting and monitoring proce-
dures, transparency requirements and enforcement provisions that came
into effect with promulgation of the LAL and Zhejiang province’s
supplementary regulations. Nevertheless, they were confident that these
would help to reduce the rate and scale of housing construction in the
countryside. They claimed that in keeping with the LAL, only new
households could apply for vacant house sites and construction could
only occur on land that was zoned for residential purposes. Any house-
hold that wanted to rebuild had to produce certificates of ownership and
approval for the construction of their old house – an impossible task for
most villagers. All township bureaus had erected billboards to educate
villagers about the new law and regulations, advise them of the fees
payable for the allocation of house sites and construction permits and
warn them of sanctions against illegal construction and excessive land
use. Notices about compensation payments for land requisition and
relocation, pending building applications and the penalties meted out for
infringements were placed in government offices and local newspapers.
Government statistics and my interviews indicate that these measures
48. Zhang Shuigen suggests this possibility in “Nongmin zhuzhai jianshe: xingwei, xintai
fenxi” (“Rural housing construction: an analysis of behaviour and attitudes”), Cunzhen
jianshe, No. 5 (1990), pp. 24–25, 21.
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Table 7: Perceptions of the Degree of Difficulty in Constructing Housing
after 1999 (% surveyed households)
Since January 1999,
has the construction of
housing become: More difficult No change Easier Don’t know
Lehuo 33.7 52.2 9.8 4.3
Yubao 72.3 21.7 4.8 1.2
Qingshui 56.2 21.3 18 4.5
Zhulong 25 34.4 21.9 18.8
Total 50.3 32.4 12.2 5.1
did indeed slow the pace of construction. Late in 1998, the Bureaus were
deluged with applications for new house sites as people rushed to get
approval before the new law came into effect. In 1999, there was an
approximately 40 per cent reduction in the number of applications and in
the first half of 2000 a further drop of around 50 per cent. Implementation
of the LAL also intensified the decline, observable since the mid-1990s,
in the number of cases of illegal and extensive building. Fewer disputes
over housing construction and fewer infringements of regulations were
recorded in each township.
As shown in Table 7, most survey respondents believed that in
1999–2000 it was more difficult to construct housing than it had been
previously. When asked why, the majority referred to more complicated
application processes, restrictive conditions and the shortage of available
house sites. Not surprisingly, in Lehuo, where planning regulations had
been in place for some years, slightly more than half the surveyed
villagers said the degree of difficulty had not changed. In contrast, in
Qingshui and Zhulong many respondents answered that housing construc-
tion was actually easier than in the past, not because of a relaxation of
government constraints but because their incomes had improved or
building materials were cheaper.
The extent to which the LAL succeeds in conserving farmland will be
determined not only by the immensity of the obstacles it places in the
way of would-be builders, but also by the degree to which there is
popular understanding of, and support for, controls over housing con-
struction and land-use. Table 8 indicates that although a majority of
villagers surveyed said that they knew nothing about the LAL, there was
widespread agreement that the central government should control rural
housing construction. Moreover, the reasons most frequently given in
support for central government controls concur with the government’s
own logic: China has too little arable land; farmland should be used in the
most economically efficient manner; therefore excessive and illegal con-
950 The China Quarterly
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struction should be prevented. Several people stated that competition for
land should be regulated so as to protect poor families’ land-use rights
and welfare. Similar explanations were given in support of village
committee controls over housing construction. However, there was a
slight, but telling, difference in emphasis. Fewer respondents mentioned
land shortages and the need for economic efficiency, and more wrote that
lower-level governments should support and enforce national laws and
protect the land use rights of the poor and future generations.
Although respondents’ age, income and education do not affect their
backing for land use controls, there are small, but significant, variations
between villages. Respondents in Yubao who have had first-hand experi-
ence of the effects of rapid urbanization and unregulated real estate
markets and are confronted almost daily by conservation propaganda
emanating from Hangzhou are more enthusiastic about government inter-
vention than are the residents of other villages (see Figure 1). Respon-
dents in Zhulong expressed the least support for stronger government
controls, perhaps reflecting suspicions based on governments’ previous
failure to prevent the “sale” of village land by the old Party secretary.
There also are variations in the attitudes of different occupational
groups. The greater the amount of time villagers spend farming, the
less likely they are to agree that governments should regulate housing
construction (see Figure 1, Table 9). In view of the fact that nowadays,
autonomy in production is one of the few perks of farming, it is
understandable that some farmers are reluctant to relinquish their right
to determine land use. Moreover, among all villagers, farmers are
least likely already to own a new house or to own multiple houses, and
they may fear they will be denied the chance to achieve their housing
goals.
Figure 1: Should the Government Control Rural Housing Construc-
tion? (0Yes, 1No)
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Table 9: Should the Government Control Rural Housing Construction?
(% respondents)
Days spent farming per annum Yes No Don’t know
Less than 50 days 87.2 9.6 3.2
50–100 days 74.4 12.8 12.8
More than 101 days 72 21.3 6.7
Villagers’ agreement with the principle of government controls over
housing does not extend to support for a strengthening of regulations. On
the contrary, in Yubao, Qingshui and Zhulong villagers perceive a
shortcoming not in the legislation, but in its implementation by local
officials. They repeatedly complained that village planning is ignored by
township governments:
We should have a proper plan to organize reconstruction of the village. But the town
government doesn’t plan anything, except its own business. All these officials think
about is how to make more money. In the past the countryside was well governed,
but the officials we’ve got now spend all their time smoking expensive cigarettes and
drinking beer that costs 2.5 yuan a bottle. They come here and look at us villagers
and say, “You’re doing all right. You’re building houses so you must be making
money.” Then they say we should pay this tax and that fee and a fine for something
else … People have become short-sighted as a result of this. They only care about
their own families and don’t bother to plan collectively.49
Nor do villagers believe that land use regulations are applied equally
and impartially. They said that township officials and village leaders
waive prohibitions against multiple house-ownership, extensive building
and the allocation of sites to households that have rented or sold houses
when processing applications from their family and friends. In Yubao
and Zhulong, local officials were further accused of abusing their admin-
istrative authority in order to gain a monopoly over local rental and real
estate markets:
Some of the officials have two houses. Two new houses! They live in one and rent
out the other. Of course, there are also ordinary families that didn’t demolish their old
houses when they rebuilt. The old places might be left empty or rented out. That’s
different to what the leaders do, though. They monopolize all the best house
locations, and then when ordinary people like us apply for a new site they say there
isn’t any land and we have to demolish our old house and build on the same site.50
Villagers were not alone in voicing suspicions that some lower-level
governments were continuing to approve construction on farmland.
According to a leading cadre in the Land Management Bureau of
Shaoxing city:
49. Interview Qingshui, 27 July 2000.
50. Interview Yubao, 6 August 2000.
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Some officials in the Construction Bureaus haven’t quite come to terms with the new
regime, and still follow their old ways. Most of these sorts of problems, of
Construction Bureaus approving building on agricultural land, eventually will be
resolved because the new Law removes the authority of town level governments to
approve changes in land use.51
Of greater significance for this study, however, is the fact that vil-
lagers’ housing aims are not moderated by their support for either the
principle or the legislation of farmland conservation. Even in Yubao, the
community that most strongly approves of restrictions on house-building,
new houses are considered essential to the achievement of families’
demographic and social aims. To this end, households are prepared to
divide, send their members out to work and demolish large, structurally
sound houses in order to secure permission to rebuild.
Conclusion
Cross-cultural studies of home ownership demonstrate that people
usually have multiple reasons for wanting a house. Behind the economi-
cally “rational” references to exorbitant rental costs and asset accumula-
tion that are frequently advanced to explain the acquisition of a dwelling,
there often lurks the idea that a house is necessary to sustain a family.52
In Zhejiang villages, new houses are built to accommodate changes in
the life cycle and lifestyle of families and help them succeed socially and
economically. These goals motivate both affluent and poor households.
As my data show, the location and economy of a village has only a small
effect on the occurrence of these motives. Certainly, in comparison to
Qingshui and Zhulong, the residents of Lehuo and Yubao are more
inclined to build because they consider their old house too dilapidated or
inconvenient. That assessment is informed by income growth and
exposure to changing architectural styles. But there too, responsiveness
to fashion is bound up with the desire to provide for the family’s
demographic and social needs in the future.
On the other hand, village location and economy and household
income do affect the construction of housing. Proximity to a city offers
business and employment opportunities which, in turn, boost mean
average incomes. Except in Lehuo where land management officials and
planners limit housing, high incomes increase the propensity to build and
the scale of building. Because farmers’ incomes are lower than non-
farmers’ incomes, a reliance on earnings from agriculture is correlated
with low levels of housing consumption. Farming simply does not
provide villagers with enough money to achieve their ambitions with
51. Interview Shaoxing city Land Management Bureau, 20 July 2000.
52. Lynne Richards, Nobody’s Home: Dreams and Realities in a New Suburb (Melbourne:
Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 117–139; Richard Wilk, “The built environment and
consumer decisions,” in Susan Kent (ed.), Domestic Architecture and the Use of Space:
An Interdisciplinary, Cross-cultural Study (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990),
pp. 34–42.
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respect to housing. Hence, in pursuit of their dream of home-ownership,
farmers and their offspring abandon agriculture and migrate in search of
work.
With respect to the effectiveness of the LAL, 18 months after its
promulgation the new legislation had begun to control the use of collec-
tively owned land in the surveyed villages, primarily through requiring
stricter reporting and transparency by lower levels of government and
removing their authority to approve the construction of housing on
farmland. The concentrated settlement pattern and slowdown in building
activity that occurred in Lehuo after Shengzhou city government began
planning villages suggest that if the law continues to be implemented, it
will help to conserve arable land and subdue “the rural house-building
craze.”
However, findings from this study have some negative implications for
the Chinese government’s goal of preserving farmland by controlling
housing construction. First, popular support for conservation goals and
controls on housing construction is undermined by the fact that villagers
have little confidence in the capacity or willingness of officials to manage
land for the collective good. Some township governments and village
leaders have failed to abide by the LAL. Others have shown partiality in
approving applications for house sites or have monopolized land. Farm-
ers, in particular, are ambivalent about government constraints on hous-
ing construction. In view of widespread protests that have been triggered
by villagers’ dissatisfaction over local governments’ excessive extrac-
tions, usurpation of collective property rights, and housing demolition
and forced relocation,53 it is possible that government efforts to restrict
villagers’ use of land for housing will also be resisted.
Secondly, the administrative controls incorporated into the LAL are not
supplemented by positive inducements that address the social and demo-
graphic aspirations propelling “the rural house-building craze.” The
property rights incentives built into the law are unlikely to be effective,
given that farming is considered to be unprofitable and land is not valued
either as a source of income or as an exchange item.
Indeed, some clauses in the LAL may limit villagers’ ability to
accumulate investment capital, rent accommodation and provide welfare.
In order to rebuild, many households will demolish dwellings that might
otherwise serve as rental properties, depriving them of an extra source of
revenue and leaving in-migrants and young couples without housing.
Other households will divide in order to become eligible to apply for new
building sites. The poor will disperse as able-bodied adults migrate to
earn money for housing construction. In less affluent villages, the sick
and elderly might be faced with solitude as well as material deprivation.
53. Xiaolin Guo, “Land expropriation and rural conflicts in China,” The China Quarterly,
No 166 (2001), pp. 422–439; Liu Yuan, “Fighting city hall,” Asiaweek, 26 January 2001,
pp. 30–34; Reuters, 3 September 2000, accessed at http:///www.insidechina.com/investorsin-
sight/business; Sally Sargeson and Zhang Jian, “Reassessing the role of the local state: a case
study of local government interventions in property rights reform in a Hangzhou district,” The
China Journal, No. 42 (1999), pp. 77–99.
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Eventually, of course, out-migration together with declining birth rates
will reduce demand for rural housing. But my findings suggest that these
changes are unlikely to exert a significant effect in the near future.
Throughout the countryside migrants’ remittances are funding the build-
ing of utopian sanctuaries for absent family members. The majority of
villagers that participated in this research have only one child, but like
many parents of only-children they are determined to provide their
offspring with “the best.”54 Village norms and architectural and lifestyle
marketing depict “the best” as a beautiful, modern villa that provides
space, “face,” privacy and a period of debt-free grace in which the family
can diversify its investments. In the Zhejiang countryside, these attitudes
will continue to fuel “the rural-house-building craze.”
54. Deborah S. Davis and Julia S. Sensenbrenner, “Commercializing childhood: parental
purchases for Shanghai’s only child,” in Deborah S. Davis (ed.), The Consumer Revolution
in Urban China (Berkeley: University of California, 2000), pp. 54–79.
